On 22 October 1634, the clerk responsible for keeping the diary drawn up in Batavia Castle and 'the wife of a prominent Moor there residing' were found to be 'having carnal conversation through a large hole in the wall of said lodge'. To make things worse, when Cartwright left on Company business to nearby Balasore, he had attempted to take the married woman with him. 4
By calling attention to diplomacy in provincial settings, this chapter seeks to advance two further goals. First, it aims to bring East India Company history into closer conversation with the flourishing field of early modern diplomatic history. 10 Second, it addresses the ways in which the Companies became integrated into local political contexts. Borrowing from a range of disciplines, 'New Diplomatic History' has called attention to the prominent role of social networks, cultural practices, and non-state and non-elite actors in the development of early modern diplomatic exchange. 11 In the process, our notion of early modern diplomacy has been markedly expanded. No longer viewing diplomacy as the exclusive preserve of high politics bounded by a Eurocentric chronology, scholars have also begun to take account of the many contributions of non-European actors to the wider development of diplomatic institutions and practices. 12 While the contours of a 'diplomatic turn' are increasingly evident in scholarship on the VOC and EIC, neither these organizations nor the Asian polities they interacted with have thus far played more than a minor role in the renewal of diplomatic history. 13 My discussion of Company diplomacy in the Mughal provinces of Bengal and Orissa combines exploration of diplomacy at 'sub-state levels' with the recent interest in 'sub-state diplomatic actors' such as trading companies. 14 I start by examining the foundations of the relationship between the Companies and the Mughal administration in Bengal and Orissa through a focus on Ralph Cartwright's mission to the provincial court in Cuttack (Katak) in 1633. 15 Addressing questions of diplomatic communication and cultural commensurability, this section argues that provincial diplomacy was characterized far more by immediacy than by cultural distance. 16 The next section argues that the Companies gradually became incorporated into the Mughal political landscape as a result of localized conflicts in which provincial authorities sought to exploit European naval power. It does so by charting the 
Enter the Companies
The account of Cartwright's mission to the nawab's court in Cuttack, written by the English quartermaster William Bruton and published in London in 1638, offers a useful starting point for an analysis of how Company diplomacy functioned in a provincial setting. Bruton's detailed description of Cartwright's mission provides a picture of what may well have been a typical diplomatic encounter at a provincial court, and allows us to contrast it to diplomatic proceedings at the seat of imperial power in capital cities such as Agra and Delhi. Compared to the better-known English and Dutch embassies to the Mughal imperial centre -including Roe's mission to the court of Jahangir (1615-1618) and Dircq van Adrichem's embassy to the court of Aurangzeb (1662) -diplomatic engagements at the lower rungs of the imperial hierarchy stand out for their more strikingly ad hoc character, decentralized decisionmaking, and informal rituals of interaction. 17 They were also more specific in focus. To a far greater degree than diplomacy at the imperial court, provincial diplomacy dealt directly with the regulation of, and disputes arising from, site-specific political and commercial interactions. In the case of Cartwright's 1633 journey to Cuttack, what was at stake were English rights to trade freely within the nawab's domains and the containment of both the Akbar (r. 1556 Akbar (r. -1605 . The Sultanate of Bengal was conquered in 1575-1576 and the annexation of Orissa followed in 1593, although imperial authority in the region remained hotly contested until the 1610s. 18 Once incorporated into the empire, the Mughal province (subah) of Bengal was governed by a viceroy or provincial governor (subahdar) appointed by the emperor. Orissa was made into a separate province in 1607, although it continued to fall under the authority of the governor of Bengal, his deputy, or someone recommended by him. 19 Reflecting its importance as one of the empire's richest provinces, the government of Bengal was only entrusted to noblemen of the highest rank, including imperial princes such as Shah Shuja (1639-1660) and other relatives of the reigning emperor such as Aurangzeb's maternal uncle, Shaista Khan (1664 Khan ( -1678 Khan ( , 1679 Khan ( -1688 . Traditionally regarded as a highly centralized empire, recent studies have argued for the relative autonomy of Mughal government in the provinces and its crucial reliance on the participation of local power holders. 20 They have also stressed the vital importance of political and military support networks centred on princely households as a means by which members of the dynasty strengthened their own power bases. 21 The point was picked up by contemporary European observers, who commented that some Mughal governors in the provinces ruled as if they were kings themselves. 22 Seventeenth-century Bengal retained the character of a frontier region, and internal resistance from subordinate chieftains as well as armed conflicts against neighbouring Assam and Arakan (comprising parts of modern-day Bangladesh and Myanmar) continued during the reigns of Shah Jahan (r. and Aurangzeb (r. 1658 Aurangzeb (r. -1707 . 23 24 In 1632 matters came to a head when Qasim Khan, then subahdar of Bengal, attacked Hugli, the principal Portuguese settlement in the region. His successful siege asserted Mughal control over the Ganges delta and curbed the political threat the defiant 'Franks' (firangis) posed to imperial authority. 25 While Portuguese influence in Bengal before 1632 or the extent of its decline afterwards should not be overstated, the fall of Hugli nevertheless served to expedite the establishment of English and Dutch factories in the region from 1633 onwards. 26 The Companies certainly did not lack encouragement from local authorities, who welcomed additional outside parties as means of expanding economic activity within their districts and boosting tax income. 27 It was such 'promises […] for Traffick, and to be Custome-free' which encouraged John Norris, the EIC's Agent on the Coromandel Coast, to dispatch Ralph Cartwright's party to Orissa. 28 (IMAGE 3 BELONGS Having set out from Masulipatnam aboard an Indian junk hired for the occasion, Cartwright, William Bruton, and six other Englishmen arrived in the small town of Harishpur Garh at the mouth of the Mahanadi river delta on 21 April 1633. 29 Cartwright, Bruton, and a third EIC agent soon travelled onwards by river bark and by land to Cuttack, the capital of the Orissa subah, but not before fending off a surprise attack from the Pipli-based nachoda (captain) of a Portuguese-owned frigate. 30 In parallel to Cartwright's journey, the captain of this vessel, now detained by the English, also made his way to Cuttack to plead his case. 32 Attended by some 40 to 50 courtiers besides a hundred armed guards, the nawab maintained a sumptuous court which duly impressed Bruton. His detailed descriptions of the palace and the spatial configuration of the darbar underline the fact that provincial courts were essentially smaller versions of the royal household, with similar business conducted as in the emperor's Diwan-i-Am or Hall of Public Audience. 33 Bruton's depiction of courtiers sitting cross-legged around the nawab and the English representative engaging in unmediated interaction with the ruler, however, suggests a level of proximity much greater than at Shah Jahan's heavily scripted public audiences, where few Company envoys enjoyed the honour of being received, and opportunities for direct communication were extremely limited. 34 Having been introduced by Mirza Momein, Cartwright bowed before the nawab, kissed his foot, and was directed to sit down beside the nawab's brother. Next, the visitors offered up their somewhat modest assortment of gifts, consisting of 20 pounds each of cloves, mace, and nutmeg, small quantities of damask and cloth, a gilded mirror, a rifle and a double-barrelled pistol. 35 Apparently without prior negotiations or indeed the composition of a written petition, Cartwright (or rather his interpreter) proceeded to explain the English requests to the certainly when compared to the rigid protocol of diplomatic audiences at the imperial court, is that during his second appearance at the darbar Cartwright not only had the audacity to walk out in the midst of proceedings (or so Bruton claimed), but also faced no consequences for doing so. 36 Further evidence of the heightened degree of immediacy in this courtly encounter is provided by the absence of references to interactions with scribes and lowertier administrators, the two-way dialogue between Cartwright and the nawab, and the fact that the latter publicly authorized the parwana (decree) with his own seal in the presence of the English. What is more, when the nawab hosted a banquet for the principal noblemen under his command, he invited Cartwright to eat with the Muslim courtiers, summoned the Englishman to sit beside him, and personally clad him with a robe of honour. The significance of this personalized act of investiture was not lost on Bruton, who emphasized that the nawab 'with his own hands did put it upon our Merchant'. 37 Commonly referred to by its Arabic name of khil'at (or kelʽat), the granting of robes of honour was widespread in South Asia and adjacent regions as an important public ritual in which a superior gifted a subordinate with a special mark of favour as a means to establish or reaffirm bonds of loyalty and service. 38 With this ceremonial gesture the nawab symbolically incorporated the English representative into his client network -a concrete reminder both of the continuity of languages of political authority between the imperial centre and provincial courts and of the close entanglement between diplomatic relationships and interpersonal ties.
The Company's request to trade in Orissa and the nawab's decision to confiscate the Portuguese-owned vessel which the English had meant to seize for themselves were conclusively dealt with during Cartwright's third audience. It is by looking at these negotiations that the purposes of provincial diplomacy become more apparent. Persian merchants attending the court were invited to provide intelligence about English trading activities, the Company's maritime strength, and its practice of seizing Indian ships not carrying a pass issued by the English, Dutch, or Danish. Given the tendency of all European participants in Indian Ocean trade to employ maritime force as a means to back their commercial ambitions, there is certainly something to be said for Bruton's suggestion that it was the potential economic damage which the EIC could inflict by hampering commercial activity in Orissa that induced the nawab to grant Cartwright the desired exemption from custom duties and license to build a factory. 39 Concern about English maritime strength certainly underpinned the nawab's insistence that the English not seize any vessel belonging to the nawab or his subjects, nor attack any other ship within the boundaries of Orissa regardless of its origins. Asserting control over a potentially unruly outside element was also at work in the nawab's demand that disputes between the English and his subjects were to be judged by himself, which came with the veiled admonition that the English were expected to 'behav[e] themselves as Merchants ought to doe'. 40 Contemporary Mughal edicts concerning the VOC confirm this picture. A parwana granted in 1636 by the subahdar of Bengal, Islam Khan Mashadi, stipulated that the Dutch should not hinder the Portuguese trading in Hugli and that they were not allowed to export gunpowder and saltpetre nor carry away Bengali slaves or workmen. 41 In the same year, Shah Jahan issued a farman that sought to limit the Dutch presence in Bengal to no more than 30 unarmed men at a time. 42 While the threat of maritime force thus clearly played a role, Bruton's explanation ignores the larger benefits that accrued to the Mughal administration as a result of its commercial policy vis-à-vis the Europeans. Cartwright agreed to provide English assistance to the nawab's subjects when finding the latter 'in distresse either by foule Weather, or in danger of Enemies', and to supply them with hardware and victuals in case of need. 43 
Islam
Khan decreed that local officials should have the first right to inspect and buy any exotic rarities imported by the VOC. And Shah Jahan roundly proclaimed that the Dutch were to be shown all favour because their trade would further enrich Bengal, enlarge his income, and bring profits to local administrators. 44 The challenge for Mughal officials in the maritime provinces was to profit economically from the largely mutually beneficial relationship they forged with European traders, while reining in the potentially harmful effects of the latter's presence in their domains. Often this meant exploiting competition between parties as well as identifying the right horse to back. During Cartwright's stay in Cuttack, one Mir Qasim, governor of the coastal town of Balasore, initially spoke on behalf of the Pipli-based nachoda. Then, upon observing the turn of events, he shifted his support to the English, presented Cartwright with various gifts, and successfully induced the merchant to settle the EIC's second factory in Orissa under his jurisdiction. Especially when customs duties had been assigned or farmed to a local official, the latter had every incentive to increase the volume of trade in the relevant district as a means to achieve higher returns on his investment. More generally, the imperial administration looked favourably upon European trade because it channelled much-needed quantities of precious metals into the Mughal economy. 45 Recounting the final audience at Cuttack on 8 May 1633, Bruton describes how 'our Merchant (reverently) took his leave of the King, and the King (with his Nobles) did the same to him, wishing him all good successe in his affaires in his Countrey'. 46 The picture that emerges in accounts such as these is of a provincial diplomacy characterized by mutuality and apparently unhindered by any serious form of cultural barrier. Save for a stock 11 reference to Cartwright's initial refusal to kiss the nawab's foot, the Englishmen's participation in Mughal court ceremonial is nowhere problematized or made to appear less than self-evident. Indeed, the remark that the nawab and Cartwright were able to communicate in 'Moores language' -presumably referring to the colloquial Hindustani spoken in northern India, and here contrasted to the formal Persian used during court proceedings -serves to underline the impression that the principal actors in this encounter were conversant in the same diplomatic idiom. 47 This seeming reciprocality in the communicative sphere was mirrored by the forging of mutually beneficial commercial relations. Still, so shortly after Qasim Khan's startling attack on Hugli, few European observers would have failed to recognize that, ultimately, the terms of the diplomatic relationship were principally set by the nawab and the state power he represented. It was this message that in 1634 found its way into the Batavia Dagh-register in the form of the perhaps apocryphal story about the fate of the newly-built English Hariharpur factory.
Co-opting the Companies
In charting the establishment of diplomatic arrangements between representatives of the East India Companies and governors of the easternmost Mughal provinces during the 1630s, I have discussed the precarious balance between European attempts to exploit maritime In
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Shah Shuja's recovery of Hugli on 2 July 1659 drew the VOC into the heat of the conflict. Forces loyal to the Mughal prince, who had governed Bengal as subahdar since 1639, plundered the town, killed its governor and other magistrates, and apprehended several administrators and merchants for their support to Mir Jumla. Among those detained were two VOC employees, the merchant Dirck Essinghs -acting as factory chief in the absence of directeur Mattheus van den Broeck -and the Indian broker Bhola Ram. 60 After being forced to witness the decapitation of five dignitaries, the two men were threatened with the same punishment because the local VOC representation had, on the one hand, delivered five pieces of cannon to Mir Jumla and, on the other, refused to provide ships to the governor loyal to Shah Shuja. The Company had moreover turned down the prince's request for a loan of 100,000 rupees. 61 The prompt recovery of Hugli by the imperial army enabled Essinghs and Bhola Ram to escape unharmed, yet further difficulties ensued for the Company's personnel in Dhaka. On 26 August 1659, troops belonging to Shah Shuja's son Buland Akhtar attacked the Dutch factory, took 51,000 guilders in cash and goods, imprisoned the merchants François Santvoort and Harmen Voorburgh and two Dutch assistants, and killed one of their Indian servants. 62 In an attempt to extort greater sums of money, the Dhaka merchants were told that the VOC servants in Hugli had been massacred and that they could expect to meet the same fate. The charge levelled against the Company was that the director of its trade in Bengal had not only gone off to visit Mir Jumla in his army camp but had also supplied him with eighteen pieces of cannon, two ships, and 300,000 rupees in cash. 63 While the extent of their assistance was inflated, there was indeed plenty of reason to suspect that the Dutch were siding with Aurangzeb's general, whom Van den Broeck was visiting when the take-over of Hugli took place. 64 As years of experience had taught the
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various European traders, Mir Jumla was uniquely able to exert pressure due to his extensive political and mercantile influence. At this point in time the VOC owed the nawab over 500,000 guilders borrowed to finance its Coromandel trade, with a further 400,000 rupees received in Bengal in exchange for uncoined Japanese silver. The latter transaction enabled Dutch trade to proceed at a time when the mint in Rajmahal had ceased operation as a consequence of the war, another example of the importance of good relations with the nawab. 65 Add to this the awkward circumstance that in 1658 the VOC had detained 25 elephants belonging to Mir Jumla, and it becomes clear that the Dutch in Hugli were not in a position to turn down the general's demands for cannon, gunpowder and gunners, despite being aware of the likely repercussions for their colleagues still residing under Shah Shuja's jurisdiction. 66 Using threats to bring Dutch trade in Bengal to a standstill, and having issued orders to that effect to his subordinate officers, Mir Jumla obtained cannons, gunpowder and sulphur from the Dutch ships anchored at Hugli. When, in December 1659, Shah Shuja made another temporary advance, Mir Jumla moreover made good use of the presence of Dutch ships for the safekeeping of seven chests of silver. 67 In total the Company supplied at least eleven pieces of iron cannon and six bronze cannons to be deployed in the war, part of which it received back in 1661 and part of which remained among Mir Jumla's possessions when the latter died in 1663. 68 Requests for men and materiel continued to mark the relationship between the VOC and Mir Jumla after the end of the succession war. In September 1660, Mir Jumla detained Dutch ships to pressure the Company into supplying assistance in his pursuit of Shah Shuja, while also demanding the service of a Dutch galliot for his expedition to establish imperial authority over Hijli, a small island in the Ganges estuary. 69 Dutch sources claim that it was indeed the support offered by the yacht Ougly and its commander, Jan van Leenen, which Bengal, a communication that again involved the issue of cannons. 72 Only if and when matters could not be resolved locally did the VOC take its grievances to the emperor, as happened with its claim for compensation for the attack on the Dhaka factory which Van Adrichem unsuccessfully put forward during his embassy to Delhi. 73 In closing, it is helpful to return briefly to Shaista Khan's Chittagong campaign. The viceroy's dispatch of an envoy to Batavia was significant from a diplomatic-history point of view because it involved a rare instance of a seventeenth-century Mughal emissary travelling to the capital of a European Company-state. Whilst exchanges of ambassadors took place between Mughal emperors and Goa, such reciprocity was absent in relations between the imperial court and the East India Companies. The fact that the subahdar reached out on his personal initiative once more underlines that provincial diplomacy comprised a relatively independent sphere. On 3 March 1665, the envoy, one Khwaja Ahmad, presented his master's gifts and letter at Batavia Castle. The Dutch reaped great benefit from their trade in Bengal, Shaista Khan wrote, yet they simultaneously traded in the lands of his enemies, the Magh pirates from Arakan. He threatened the Company that if it did not close its Arakan factory and support his expedition with ships and cannons, the Dutch would be forced not only to leave Bengal but to cease their operations throughout the empire. 74 While the Hoge Regering did decide to close its lodge in Arakan, it initially put off naval assistance on the grounds that the nawab's request lacked sufficient practical detail. The governing council only consented in July 1666 after a second envoy sent by Shaista Khan had delivered a farman authorized by Aurangzeb. 75 Of particular interest are Batavia's reasons for not establishing direct contact with the emperor to discuss his viceroy's demands: 'we have considered that the nawab in Bengal resides far from the court, and that if we forward the letter he sent us to His Majesty, and if 
Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with the topic of provincial diplomacy through a focus on two episodes that highlight different aspects of the political and commercial relationship between the seventeenth-century East India Companies and the Mughal state. It has argued that the provincial setting is a vital albeit often neglected site to explore the place of the Companies in the Mughal political landscape, and that diplomacy offers an appropriate lens through which to analyse the complex politics of trade and violence that shaped MughalEuropean interactions. Many of the diplomatic arrangements that set the parameters for such interactions were worked out along the empire's maritime frontier rather than at the centre, thus challenging notions of centre and periphery with regard to diplomatic decision- As a closer look at the VOC's position in mid-century Bengal makes clear, the perspective of provincial diplomacy is also useful in scrutinizing diplomacy's blurred edges.
When did a trading relationship shade into one of political vassalage, and when should we forego the prism of inter-state relations and think in terms of domestic frameworks for political solicitation instead? Answers to these questions will provide better insight into the diverse ways in which the Companies came to be incorporated into existing political structures across Asia. In much the same way that economic historians have positioned the role of East India Company trade within global networks of production and consumption, the study of Company diplomacy has the potential to highlight how macro-processes of global integration took shape through cross-cultural interactions in a variety of local sites. 78 Such future work is likely to accentuate the vital importance of the incentives, constraints, and power differentials encountered in various local contexts in shaping diplomatic relationships, and through the latter, the Companies' larger commercial and political presence in early modern Asia.
